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Book Review
THE POLITICS OF AIRLINE DEREGULATION. By Anthony E.
Brown. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1987.
pp. 224.
REVIEWED BY JAMES J. MCDONALD, JR.*
Professor Brown's work focuses upon the thesis that de-
regulation of the airline industry challenged much of the
conventional wisdom regarding the politics of the regula-
tory process. This book presents a comprehensive treat-
ment of both the history of airline regulation and the
events which led to the enactment of the Airline Deregu-
lation Act of 1978. However, its real value lies in its pres-
entation of airline deregulation as a phenomenon which
refuted prevailing academic theories of bureaucratic poli-
tics. Most of the theoretical approaches to the regulatory
process in vogue well into the 1980s held that regulatory
reform could only be realized on an incremental basis. In
other words, the regulatory structure must have ex-
panded, or at least have survived largely intact, at the
completion of the reform process.1 As Brown demon-
strates, airline deregulation - which involved the abolish-
ment of a major government agency and repeal of much
* Associate, Fisher & Phillips, Atlanta, Georgia. B.A. 1981, New College of the
University of South Florida; J.D. 1984, Georgetown University.
I A. BROWN, THE POLITICS OF AIRLINE DEREGULATION 17 (1987) (hereinafter
"Brown"), citing D. BRAYBROOKE & C. LINDBLOM, A STRATEGY OF DECISION: POLICY
EVALUATION AS A SOCIAL PROCESS.
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of the statutory scheme regulating airline economics -
obviously represented a significant departure from prior
regulatory experience and its accompanying academic
theories.
I. HISTORY OF AIRLINE REGULATION
Brown begins his study with a history of the regulatory
regime governing airlines - a regime that has existed
since the industry's infancy. He identifies the Air Mail Act
of 1925,2 directing the Post Office to determine air mail
routes and to award mail contracts to private air carriers,
as the first legislative scheme tying the economic fortunes
of the airlines to government policy.3 Ultimately, the Civil
Aeronautics Act of 19384 emerged from this scheme, and
the government's regulatory involvement in the airline in-
dustry became pervasive. In 1940, the Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB) was born out of the first organizational re-
structuring to occur under the 1938 Act. The CAB had
authority to restrict entry into the industry by new carri-
ers, regulate existing airline entry into and exit from
routes, establish uniform fares, approve airline mergers
and acquisitions, monitor the financial operation of airline
companies and exempt airlines from the operation of the
antitrust laws. Initially, the CAB also had the authority to
issue safety rules and investigate accidents. But its safety
responsibilities were shifted to the Federal Aviation
Agency- in 1958 and its accident investigation role was
transferred to the National Transportation Safety Board
in 1966. As Brown goes on to demonstrate, however, the
CAB continued to play a prominent role in airline regula-
tion in spite of the loss of its safety-related functions.
Brown posits that the CAB's carrier licensing require-
2 43 Stat. 805 (1925).
Brown, supra note 1, at 6.
4 52 Stat. 973 (1938).
5 The Federal Aviation Agency was renamed the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion and became part of the Department of Transporation upon that Depart-
ment's creation in 1965. Brown, supra note 1, at 9-10.
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ments served as the "cornerstone" of the regulatory
framework. 6 As a carrier could not provide air transporta-
tion service without certification from the CAB, that
agency was able to control the participation of air carriers
in the commercial air transport system, to affect the level
and types of service on a given route, and ultimately to
determine the structure of the industry itself. In carrying
out this last function, the CAB developed a system of clas-
sifying the carriers by type - "trunk," local service, "sup-
plemental" (non-scheduled), cargo and commuter. The
agency focused its primary attention on the existing trunk
carriers, having closed further entry into the trunk classifi-
cation in 1941.? The CAB's strict control of route entry
and exit and fare levels generally left those carriers with
latitude to compete with one another only on the basis of
service, such as equipment, flight scheduling and passen-
ger services, though Brown points out that the agency did
permit isolated price competition among carriers (largely
in the form of discount or excursion fares) during periods
of industry profitability.
Brown then traces the history of the regulatory reform
movement in the airline industry. He notes that the theo-
retical groundwork for deregulation was laid during the
1950s and 1960s, when academic economists began to
criticize economic regulation in industry generally.8
These studies provided a highly credible source of sup-
port for deregulation proponents.
Brown goes on to identify four major historical aspects
of the airline regulatory reform process. First, the Ford
Administration campaigned against inflation and linked
inflation with overregulation. Second, Senator Edward
Kennedy's Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Prac-
tices and Procedure clarified the need for some type of
regulatory reform in the airline industry during investiga-
tive hearings conducted in 1974. Brown postulates that
o Id. at 47.
7 Delta Air Corporation Case, 2 C.A.B. 447, 480 (1941).
9 Brown, supra note 1, at 102.
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the credibility of the Kennedy subcommittee's pro-reform
conclusions was enhanced by the fact that the subcommit-
tee did not ordinarily supervise the CAB, affording the
subcommittee a maximum degree of independence.
Third, the Carter White House carefully assembled a di-
verse coalition of powerful interests to advocate reform.
This coalition included groups such as Ralph Nader's Avi-
ation Consumer Action Project, the American Conserva-
tive Union, the National Association of Manufacturers,
and the American Farm Bureau Federation. Last, a shift
occurred immediately preceding legislative deregulation,
toward a more pro-competitive stance. Alfred Kahn ef-
fected this shift in large part when he became chairman of
the CAB in 1977 and filled key staff jobs at the agency
with proponents of deregulation.
Brown illustrates that the principal opponents of dereg-
ulation during this period were the chief objects of the
regulatory regime - the larger scheduled carriers and
their employees. Having grown comfortable with the pro-
tective cloak of CAB fare regulation, the major carriers
feared that deregulation would lead to cutthroat competi-
tion among them (not an altogether unfounded fear, as it
turns out). United Airlines broke ranks with its fellow ma-
jors on this issue in 1977, and was joined by Western and
Braniff and ultimately the Air Transport Association in
1978. The largest airline unions also initially opposed de-
regulation. According to Brown, these unions believed
that deregulation promised greater price competition be-
tween the old, heavily-unionized carriers and new en-
trants. Under deregulation's free-entry scheme, new
entrants would enjoy significantly lower labor costs.9 La-
For a discussion of the impact of the emergence of new entrants upon estab-
lished carriers as a result of deregulation, see Northrup, The New Employee-Relations
Climate in Airlines, 36 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 167 (1983). While some unions
were forced to agree to concessions in wages, benefits and work rules as a result of
deregulation, airline industry employment increased by 8.8 percent, and average
annual compensation for airline employees increased by 62 percent, after deregu-
lation. See McDonald, Airline Management Prerogative in the Deregulation Era, 52 J. AIR
L. & CoM. 869, 927 (1987).
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bor's opposition to deregulation diminished, however,
when the unions were assured that the final version of any
deregulation legislation would include labor protective
provisions.
Ultimately, the legislation introduced in its initial form
as the Aviation Reform Act of 1975 was signed into law by
President Carter in October 1978 as the Airline Deregula-
tion Act of 1978. Dramatically, the final form of this leg-
islation did not merely accomplish a "reform" of airline
regulation. Rather, it entirely eliminated much of the
statutory scheme regulating airlines and provided for the
abolishment of the CAB on January 1, 1985.
II. AIRLINE INDUSTRY DEREGULATION
Brown recounts in some detail the process by which the
initial push for reform led to a belief that the chief evil in
airline regulation was regulation itself.'0 Yet, there are
two themes of particular significance to be gleaned from
Brown's work. First, the virtual abolishment of the regu-
latory scheme ran counter to all popular theories of regu-
latory politics. The airline deregulation example is a case
of the political process prevailing over the bureaucratic, a
notion all but dismissed by political theorists in the 1960s
and 1970s. Second, Brown elaborates the political strate-
gies that succeeded in overcoming the entrenched regula-
tory culture in the airline industry..
In order to appreciate Brown's first theme, it is impor-
tant to understand the transformations in political
thought concerning the nature of government regulation
that have occurred over the last century. The classical
model of government bureaucracy, perhaps best charac-
terized by Max Weber's example," 1 holds that the govern-
ment agency is simply an instrument of the policy process; a
mere tool for carrying out a political agenda established
outside of the agency. 12 This classical view gave way to
1o Brown, supra note 1, at 95-127.
11 See M. WEBER, ECONOMY & SOCIETY (G. Roth & C. Wittich, eds., 1968).
12 See V. THOMPSON, BUREAUCRACY AND THE MODERN WORLD 2-14 (1976).
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what Brown terms the "revisionist" approach to govern-
ment regulation. Under the revisionist view, the regula-
tory agency is not an instrument of policy but rather the
source of most policy, with an agenda of its own. Members
of the agency largely shape the agenda in conjunction
with the industry or group regulated and the congres-
sional subcommittees having oversight authority over the
agency.1 3 The "iron triangle" thus formed represents a
vested interest in the existing regulatory regime accord-
ing to revisionist theorists. It also presents a nearly in-
surmountable barrier to regulatory reform, much less
outright deregulation. As Brown describes it, "survival is
the dominant bureaucratic imperative .... Not only are
organizations designed to resist termination, they can
adapt to changing circumstances by altering their clien-
tele, objectives, and policies."' 4 Thus, as Brown ob-
serves, most efforts at regulatory "reform" are
incremental in nature. The regulatory agent's resources
and the scope of its mission generally turn out to be even
greater after the reform process than before, as incremen-
tal reform "prescribes procedural and organizational so-
lutions to remedy regulatory problems."'' 5
Deregulation of the airline industry clearly failed to fol-
low the revisionist model; however, Brown devotes con-
siderable effort trying to explain this result. To be sure,
sentiment for public sector retrenchment increased in the
mid-to-late 1970s in the face of rampant inflation and the
spiraling public deficit. This in itself cannot be a sufficient
explanation for what occurred. After all, the whole em-
phasis of the revisionist theory is upon the demonstrated
ability of programs and agencies to survive in the midst of
a shrinking revenue base and negative public sentiment.
What is interesting about the airline deregulation exam-
ple, as Brown points out, is that a number of different
1 Brown, supra note 1, at 13.
14 Id. at 39.
15 Id. at 28.
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political factors coalesced to allow the radical result of
near complete deregulation to occur.
First, public disaffection grew with the CAB and its anti-
competitive policies. As the "Golden Age" of air travel
suffered a decline by the end of the 1960s, the CAB reas-
sumed its traditional, more restrictive approach to airline
competition in order to protect the profitability of the in-
dustry as a whole.' 6 This move turned out to be politi-
cally unpopular, however, as the CAB commonly was
perceived as merely protecting the trunk carriers at the
expense of smaller carriers and the traveling public.
Moreover, the fact that the CAB's chairman at the time,
Robert Timm, was the subject of several political scandals
hardly enhanced the agency's credibility. The political at-
mosphere was ripe for a change.
The second factor concerns the manner in which the
deregulation concept was politically packaged. In order
to garner the support of the adverse group of interests
referred to earlier, deregulation was promoted as a means
to multiple ends. Proponents sold it to consumer groups
as a promise of lower fares. They sold it to conservative
business groups as a means of reducing inflation caused
by excessive governmental intervention. Brown observes
that "[t]he most significant reason for passage of the act
was its bipartisan support. Pro-consumer Democrats
joined with free enterprise Republicans."'' 7
The third factor concerns what Brown describes as "eq-
uity compromises." Such compromises become necessary
if the elimination of a regulatory scheme threatens the
welfare of vocal interests. The airline deregulation bill
contained such compromises in the labor protective pro-
visions and the small community service program. As in-
dicated earlier, organized labor initially opposed
deregulation. Unions feared that the increased airline
merger activity and the onslaught of low-cost new en-
trants would threaten employee job security and the un-
- Id. at 99.
17 Id. at 140.
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ions' traditionally strong position in the industry,. In
response to these concerns, proponents of deregulation
legislation added provisions for government assistance
payments and preferential hiring rights for airline em-
ployees displaced by deregulation.'" Similarly, small com-
munities feared that deregulation would mean an end to
scheduled airline service to their localities. The CAB had
ensured such service through its carrier subsidy pro-
grams. Deregulation's backers met these concerns by in-
cluding a provision that carriers maintain "essential air
service" to small communities under government subsidy
for a ten year period.
The fourth political factor which Brown emphasizes re-
gards what he calls "strategic staffing." This involves
recruiting individuals for key government positions who
are committed to, or at least are not actively opposed to,
termination of the existing regulatory framework.' 9
Brown credits CAB Chairman Alfred Kahn with filling key
staff positions at the agency with active opponents of reg-
ulation. These individuals then prepared the agency for
an unprecedented process of "administrative deregula-
tion" while Congress was still considering deregulation
legislation. As Brown puts it, the CAB's performance be-
tween 1975 and 1978 "violated much of the conventional
wisdom about the behavior of regulatory agents. The
proposition that bureaucratic behavior is motivated by or-
ganizational survival was challenged as the CAB became
progressively committed to the idea of deregulation. 20
As one principal tenet of the revisionist view is that an
agency is driven by the individuals who make it up and not
necessarily by external political forces,2 ' this factor can
provide a lesson for future regulatory reform movements.
Brown concludes that a "reevaluation of revisionist as-
Id. at 146.
Id. at 151.
21" Id. at 18.
21 C. PERROW, COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS: A CRITICAL ESSAY 152 (2d ed. 1979).
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sumptions is needed, ' 22 since "[r]evisionist explanations
tend to ignore the possibility that, though the composi-
tion of interest groups in a policy area may be stable, the
policy preferences of those groups may change. '2 3 Brown
presents a compelling critique of the revisionist theory of
regulatory politics, using airline deregulation as a case in
point. Although Brown's work is theoretically sound, his
style is somewhat disappointing. He relies more upon
quoting and citing the works of others than upon develop-
ing and presenting his own thought and analysis. None-
theless, this is an important book that should be of
interest to both reformers and students of regulatory
policy.
1 Brown, supra note 1, at 161.
" Id. at 172.
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